




• quantitative limits on each nation’s GHG emis-
sions; and 
• quantitative national limits, with a market in trad-
able GHG emissions allowances. 
A growing number of countries (including the
United States, through both the Bush and Clinton
administrations) and experts have championed the
last of these options—the creation of an interna-
tional market in tradable GHG allowances. The U.S.
government enacted this approach in 1990 to curb
domestic sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions that yield
acid rain and suggested the concept in the same year
as a potential remedy for global GHG emissions. But
at that time, the White House opposed quantitative
“targets and timetables” on GHG emissions. With-
out such aggregate quantitative constraints or
“caps,” a formal system of tradable allowances (a
cap-and-trade policy) could not function. The 1992
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) adopted at the Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, imposed no quantitative target on ag-
gregate emissions and asked countries only to un-
dertake “policies and measures” to reduce emis-
sions—with the proviso that such abatement actions
may be “implemented jointly” by countries. This
idea of joint implementation represented a window
for “informal” emissions trading through project-by-
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Making international climate policy is difficult. The
issues are complex, the impacts of policies are large
and unevenly distributed, and the costs of erring in
any direction are high. International climate negotia-
tors must address, among many tough topics, the
costs and benefits of reducing greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions; the distribution of these costs and
benefits across countries; the incentives for coun-
tries to participate in reducing global emissions; and
the innovation and diffusion of low-emissions tech-
nology, especially for use in developing countries.
How do we get from here to there? Whatever
overall goal we set for climate policy, our success in
achieving that goal effectively and efficiently will de-
pend on the policy instrument we choose. No single
instrument is universally best for all environmental
problems; all policy instruments have strengths and
weaknesses, and the choice among them is a prag-
matic and contextual matter. For global climate pol-
icy, five major options for policy instruments have
been suggested: 
• technology standards, such energy efficiency
standards for vehicles and appliances or fuel
types for electric power generators; 
• taxes on GHG emissions; 
• subsidies and other rewards for GHG emissions
abatement; 
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project collaborations but not a formal market in
tradable allowances. 
Negotiations soon began on a protocol to imple-
ment the UNFCCC. The European Union had long
advocated fixed national quantitative emissions lim-
its and expressed doubts about international emis-
sions trading. In 1993, President Bill Clinton an-
nounced that the United States would also endorse
quantitative targets and timetables on GHG emis-
sions; and the Clinton–Gore climate change action
plan advocated international allowance trading as a
way to meet that goal. In 1997, more than 2,000
economists—including several Nobel laureates—
signed a statement endorsing formal allowance trad-
ing to control global GHG emissions. After intense
negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC
was signed in December 1997 (however, as of 2000,
it had not yet been ratified by many countries, in-
cluding the United States). The Kyoto Protocol in-
cluded differentiated quantitative targets on GHG
emissions of industrialized countries, with aggregate
emissions by these countries to be cut to about 5%
below 1990 levels by 2008–12. No quantitative
emissions limit was applied to developing countries.
And the Kyoto Protocol authorized three different
versions of emissions trading to help accomplish this
goal: joint implementation of abatement projects
among industrialized countries (Article 6); a system
for developing countries to sell emissions reduction
credits to buyers in industrialized countries, called
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (Article
12); and a formal system of tradable allowances
among industrialized countries (Article 17).
If the Kyoto Protocol enters into force, the stage
will be set for international markets in GHG abate-
ment. Both economic theory and actual experience
suggest that creating such GHG emissions markets
offers great promise for lowering the cost of GHG
control, enhancing the spread of lower-emissions
technology, and broadening participation in the in-
ternational agreement to limit GHG emissions. 
Designing such a market is not simple. Concerns
have frequently been expressed that international
emissions trading could be difficult to initiate, moni-
tor, and manage. There are concerns about negotiat-
ing allowance allocations, ensuring participation, de-
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terring free riding, reducing cross-national “leakage,”
measuring emissions, and enforcing compliance.
These concerns are important, but they pertain to
any GHG emissions control policy, using any policy
instrument. They are generic concerns about global
climate policy. Indeed, a market-based approach
could actually ease these challenges. A second set of
concerns, less frequently discussed, relates uniquely
to a market-based instrument: concerns about trans-
action costs, the behavior of national governments,
and market power. These specific concerns will need
to be confronted in the design details of a GHG trad-
ing system.
The Case for International 
Emissions Trading
An international climate agreement could, in theory,
use any of the five policy instruments outlined
above. The advantages of emissions trading can be
seen most clearly by comparing national caps with
and without emissions trading; the actual treaty ne-
gotiations have focused on these two options. With-
out trading, a treaty would simply require every par-
ticipating country, acting on its own, to limit its
emissions to a certain level (its target or cap) by a
certain date. Different countries could have different
caps that imply different degrees of stringency; for
example, the caps on industrialized countries could
require absolute reductions in projected emissions,
whereas developing countries in the future could be
afforded substantial “headroom”—flexibility to in-
crease their emissions as they develop economically.
By contrast, under a market-based emissions trading
approach, countries would achieve the same aggre-
gate cap but with the flexibility to trade (that is, real-
locate by mutual agreement) their emissions abate-
ment efforts across countries. Again, different
countries could initially receive allowances equiva-
lent to national caps of different degrees of strin-
gency.
Two basic kinds of international markets for GHG
emissions abatement can be envisioned. One is a for-
mal emissions trading market—a system of tradable
allowances often called cap and trade. In this market,
the international agreement sets a cap on aggregate
emissions for some period, and the agreement also
allocates GHG emissions allowances (often also
called emissions permits) among the participating
countries for that period. The national governments
then allocate these allowances to businesses within
their countries. Emitters must hold allowances to
cover every unit they emit; they can control emis-
sions, buy additional allowances if their abatement
costs are high, and sell allowances if their abatement
costs are low. (In practice, carbon dioxide emissions
could be regulated upstream by associating al-
lowances with the carbon content of fossil fuels.) Or-
ganized exchanges are established to facilitate trad-
ing. To ensure compliance with the allowance cap, at
the end of each period, each country’s report of its
actual emissions (subject to monitoring and verifica-
tion) is compared with the allowances held for that
period by its emitters; if national emissions exceed
total allowances held, then the country is out of
compliance with the treaty and subject to whatever
penalties for noncompliance the international agree-
ment stipulates. (The penalties under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol were left for future negotiation.)
The allowances in this system could be fully in-
terchangeable, or fungible—each one representing a
unit of GHG emission, without reference to the
country from which the allowance originated—so
that buyers could rely on the value of the allowance
without investigating the seller’s behavior. In that
case, seller compliance would be ensured in the
same ways as under a national cap without trading.
Or, allowances could be denominated by the seller
country, with the provision that a selling country’s
violation of its national abatement commitments
would devalue the seller’s allowances, thereby giving
buyers an incentive to purchase from the sellers
most likely to comply with the treaty (and sellers an
incentive to ensure compliance if they hope to sell
additional allowances).
In an informal emissions trading market, on the
other hand, the international agreement does not al-
locate formal allowances. Instead, each country may
meet its abatement commitment through contracts
for project-by-project abatement services (GHG re-
ductions or sequestration) obtained both within and
outside its territory. Thus, emitters seeking to invest
in abatement services may do so at home, and they
may also purchase credits for emissions reductions
generated in other countries, including countries not
subject to an overall emissions cap. These are the
project-based trading systems envisioned by Article
6 (joint implementation among industrialized coun-
tries with emissions caps) and Article 12 (CDM
credits from developing countries without emissions
caps) of the Kyoto Protocol. The value of such cred-
its will depend on the actual abatement undertaken
at the specific site; the investor or a certifying entity
must closely monitor the ongoing performance of
the project. Abatement is measured against a base-
line forecast of emissions from that project in the ab-
sence of the joint implementation or CDM invest-
ment. Investor countries’ compliance with emissions
caps is determined by comparing the country’s cap
with the country’s actual national emissions, minus
the abatement achieved at the specific overseas proj-
ect sites credited to the country’s investors. This ap-
proach is similar to the system of pollution offsets
and emissions reductions credits adopted by the
United States prior to the acid rain program to con-
trol other air pollutants. It is also essentially the sys-
tem of joint implementation launched in the UN-
FCCC signed in 1992 at the Earth Summit. That
pilot phase of joint implementation, however, did
not allow official quantified credits to be earned by
joint implementation activities, and investment in
joint implementation was predictably muted. Under
Articles 6 and 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, official cred-
its could be earned by joint implementation and
CDM investments, presumably encouraging a more
vigorous market in such project-based trading than
had been the case under the UNFCCC pilot phase.
In both of these approaches to emissions trading,
all transactions would be voluntary. The motivation
for trading is the desire to find more advantageous
ways to comply with GHG limits. The operative
principle is mutual benefit: Sellers and buyers will
enter into transactions only when the terms of the
deal, including financial and nonfinancial rewards,
make them better off.
One of the major advantages of a market-based
approach to global climate policy is its cost-effective-
ness. Because the cost of GHG emissions abatement
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varies significantly from place to place, and because
the global environmental benefit of GHG reduction
is independent of where the emissions are reduced,
allowing any agreed level of total GHG abatement to
be undertaken where it is least costly will minimize
the overall cost of achieving the policy goal. Emis-
sions trading allows that least-cost strategy to be
identified and pursued; fixed national caps (or
worse, technology standards) do not.
Numerous studies indicate that allowing global
flexibility in the location of GHG emissions abate-
ment through emissions trading would cut the esti-
mated total cost of emissions controls considerably.
For example, the models used in a recent study of
Kyoto Protocol compliance costs suggest that the
cost savings from emissions trading within the
Annex I countries (the industrialized countries that
agreed to cap their total emissions, including Russia
and Ukraine, with their likely surplus of emission al-
lowances) are on the order of 30–50%, compared
with a similar emissions reduction treaty with effi-
cient domestic policies but without international
trading (see Weyant and Hill in Suggested Reading).
Even greater cost savings could be reaped from
global trading—on the order of 65–85%. The cost
savings also would be higher when compared with
technology standards, because both tradable and
nontradable national quotas allow important flexibil-
ity in the choice of abatement method. And these
figures may understate the cost savings, because
many of the models already assume some degree of
cost-minimizing coordination of abatement among
members of the European Union.
To put these figures in context, consider the En-
ergy Modeling Forum results reported by Weyant
and Hill on the costs of meeting the Kyoto Protocol
targets (measured in lost gross domestic product
[GDP]) without flexible international policy design.
Figures are reported for the United States, Japan, the
European Union, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand. The annual costs summed over all these
countries in 2010 range from just under $100 bil-
lion to almost $500 billion. The cost of maintaining
or further reducing emissions beyond the initial
commitment period would be larger still. Thus, the
50% cost savings offered by a flexible market-based
policy would mean considerable savings in absolute
terms. 
Of course, real-world cost savings may be differ-
ent from these model estimates. The degree of cost
savings associated with flexibility will depend on the
stringency of the emissions target, the cost of meet-
ing that target without flexibility, the specific coun-
tries that participate in the treaty, and other factors.
Real-world cost savings might be greater if emissions
trading induces innovation that further lowers abate-
ment costs, if trading is allowed over time as well as
across countries, or if controlling GHG emissions in
industrialized countries turns out to be even more
expensive (relative to developing countries) than
predicted. But real-world cost savings from flexibility
might be lower if arranging allowance transactions
proves costly, or if it turns out that industrialized
countries can control GHG emissions at home at
costs much lower (relative to developing countries)
than predicted.
Allowance trading markets have demonstrated
substantial cost savings in practice when applied to
several national pollution problems. The United
States has used market-based approaches to phase
out lead in gasoline, to cut SO2 emissions as a
means to reduce acid rain, and to control urban air
pollutants in Los Angeles. The cost savings in the
lead and SO2 cases were substantial—50% or more
compared with a control policy in which no trades
were allowed. (GHGs seem to be an even better
prospect for trading than lead and SO2, because the
variation in global abatement costs is even wider and
because there are no local “hot spot” problems for
most major GHGs.) The SO2 trading policy also
stimulated energy efficiency investments and the use
of new abatement technologies. The SO2 experience
suggests that the more cost-effective market-based
policy enabled the U.S. Congress to “buy” more pol-
lution control than it would have if control were
more expensive. Similarly, reducing the cost of GHG
abatement could well lead countries to undertake
more abatement than they otherwise would.
GHG allowance trading could also mobilize sub-
stantial resource flows to developing countries, as-
suming that abatement costs are lower in developing
countries and that the treaty allocates GHG emis-
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sions control obligations to constrain industrialized
countries while giving developing countries some
headroom to grow. These resource flows would help
poorer countries shift to a development path that is
more prosperous but with lower emissions, invest in
local health and environmental needs, and pursue
other social priorities. Resource flows to poorer
countries under a climate treaty employing emis-
sions trading could grow to exceed all official inter-
national development assistance. Some studies sug-
gest that, compared with no treaty at all, developing
countries would be net losers under a no-trading
policy in which industrialized countries cut their
own emissions (and, in the process, cut their prod-
uct imports from developing countries) and net win-
ners under a global allowance trading system in
which the cost of abatement is reduced and the de-
veloping countries can profit from allowance sales.
The prospect of such gains from allowance sales
could, in turn, attract developing countries to partic-
ipate in the GHG abatement regime. (One caveat to
these conclusions is that large resource inflows to
developing countries could create adverse terms of
trade that would crimp the growth of the developing
countries’ regular exports, as distinct from their ex-
ports of allowances.)
Participation is a fundamental issue in an interna-
tional climate agreement. Under international law,
no country is bound by a treaty unless it consents to
participate. (This is quite different from national law,
under which majority rule or perhaps fiat [a govern-
ment decree] can impose constraints on emitters
without the emitters’ consent.) Thus, under interna-
tional law, countries must find treaty participation to
be in their interest. Without the participation of de-
veloping countries in particular, industrialized coun-
tries’ GHG emission controls could be futile; the
emissions of developing economies are increasing
rapidly and soon will account for more than half of
global emissions. Controls on emissions imposed
only in industrialized countries could wind up miss-
ing the larger share of global emissions and, worse,
could induce emissions-related activities to shift to
unconstrained developing countries (as world fuel
prices fall and emitting industries relocate), thereby
exacerbating the growth in developing country emis-
sions. Such leakage of emissions from constrained to
unconstrained countries could offset much of the
climate protection sought by a treaty. Moreover, leg-
islators in industrialized countries will be loath to
vote to ratify less-than-global emissions constraints
that drive emissions-related jobs out of their elec-
toral districts; this situation appeared to be part of
the predicament with ratification of the Kyoto Proto-
col in the United States after it was negotiated. Thus,
some way of getting developing countries to partici-
pate in the global GHG treaty on terms they find at-
tractive seems crucial to ensure environmental effec-
tiveness, reduce global abatement costs, direct
needed resource flows to poorer countries, and en-
courage industrialized countries to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol. Major developing countries such as China
may see global climate change as a low priority (or
even a benefit to their farmers) and hence may resist
joining an emissions abatement treaty. Emissions
trading offers a built-in feature—the resource flows
to developing countries in return for their abatement
efforts and associated allowance sales—that could
accomplish broad participation. It also implies that
assignments of “headroom” allowances (such as
those to Russia in the Kyoto Protocol) are not a mis-
take but rather constitute an essential mechanism
for securing participation by otherwise reluctant
countries.
GHG taxes could, in principle, generate gains in
cost-effectiveness equal to those of an allowance
trading market. Theoretically, a tax imposed to
achieve a given level of emissions would exactly
equal the market price for the allowances issued to
achieve that same quantity of emissions. A tax
would offer more certainty about overall costs, be-
cause the tax would be fixed in advance, whereas the
price of emissions allowances could vary. But a tax
would offer less certainty about environmental re-
sults, because the tax by its nature does not con-
strain the quantity of emissions (and tradable al-
lowances do). Depending on the relative importance
of cost escalations versus emissions escalations, this
factor could be important. Moreover, a tax would
raise revenue that could be used to offset other dis-
tortionary taxes; tradable allowances could raise rev-
enue only if they were initially sold or auctioned, not
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if they were issued free of charge. Meanwhile, a tax
would not involve the transaction costs of structur-
ing and operating allowance trading but would in-
volve the administrative costs of tax collection. 
More problematic is that an internationally
agreed emissions tax (whether administered globally
or nationally) could be circumvented by national
subsidies and other tax code changes targeted to
buffer high-emitting industries. This problem of “fis-
cal cushioning” is very difficult to monitor from out-
side, is worsened by national tax administration, and
undermines the ability of the tax to constrain actual
emissions. 
Furthermore, a GHG tax would not create an au-
tomatic mechanism for resource transfers to devel-
oping countries, which are crucial to getting devel-
oping countries engaged. Politically difficult side
payments to developing countries would have to ac-
company the tax to secure these countries’ participa-
tion in the tax regime. Such payments could claim
much of the tax revenue that might have been put to
offsetting other distortionary taxes. Moreover, if
poorly designed, these side payments could under-
mine the incentive effect of the tax by reducing the
net price paid for emitting. Such will be the case if
the revenue redistributions are in proportion to eco-
nomic activity or emissions abatement, rather than
being decoupled from emissions. And to attract
countries’ participation, the side payments would
have to be in proportion to the actual economic bur-
den imposed by the emissions tax (net of environ-
mental benefits to that country), or countries will
not agree to the tax. Thus it seems hard to escape
the prospect that participation-attracting side pay-
ments would undermine the incentive effect of an
emissions tax. Side payments delivered through de-
veloping countries’ sales of tradable allowances, in
contrast, would not undermine the incentive effect
of the emissions trading system, because the quan-
tity constraint on aggregate emissions would still be
binding.
In developing countries, subsidies for abatement
are often proposed in domestic programs or in the
guise of official development assistance targeted at
emissions-abating activities. Developing countries
tend to resist such conditionality, unless it is truly
additional aid money. Industrialized countries some-
times resist making larger taxpayer-financed budget
outlays for foreign aid. From an environmental point
of view, a serious concern with subsidies for abate-
ment is their potential to yield perverse conse-
quences. Although the subsidy for abatement (such
as a tax on emissions, or tradable allowances) can re-
duce emissions at the margin by each subsidy-earn-
ing firm, the subsidy also could reduce the cost of
doing business in the emitting industry if it is poorly
designed—particularly if it is a subsidy per unit of
output or emissions versus a lump-sum transfer. A
subsidy for abatement can attract entry or invest-
ment into the emitting industry and perversely in-
crease net emissions. Side payments delivered
through developing countries’ sales of tradable al-
lowances, by contrast, would not yield perverse im-
pacts on emissions, because the quantity constraint
on aggregate emissions would still be binding.
Generic Concerns about 
Emissions Policy
Emissions trading therefore has several salient ad-
vantages over the other options for international
GHG policy, such as technology standards, taxes,
subsidies, and fixed national caps. But despite the
apparent advantages of an emissions trading system,
many countries and commentators continue to ex-
press concerns about using this approach to control
GHG emissions—concerns about negotiating al-
lowance allocations, ensuring participation, deter-
ring free riding, enforcing compliance, reducing
cross-national leakage, and measuring emissions.
These concerns, however, apply generically to any
emissions control regime, and allowing trading
could actually ease these concerns.
Critics worry that it will be difficult to negotiate
initial allowance allocations among countries. But
the problem of allocating control and cost responsi-
bilities is unavoidable in any climate agreement, with
or without trading, and trading could ease this prob-
lem in two ways. First, trading makes the cost alloca-
tion transparent. Technology standards and national
caps implicitly impose cost burdens that vary across
countries. The use of formal emissions trading
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makes this allocation explicit rather than disguised,
and this transparency can facilitate a bargain. Sec-
ond, allowance trading enables flexibility after the
initial allocation. Countries facing potentially high
cost burdens will know that they can purchase
abatement from countries with lower costs, and
countries with low-cost abatement opportunities will
know that they can earn substantial resource flows
by selling allowances to those with higher costs. This
flexibility would significantly relax the pressure on
negotiators to devise ideal, once-and-for all alloca-
tions in the treaty itself. As Nobel Prize–winning
economist Ronald Coase pointed out, the lower the
obstacles to reallocation of entitlements, the less the
initial assignment matters. Thus, without the oppor-
tunity for trading, initial GHG policy targets would
be more difficult to negotiate.
Some argue that a cap-and-trade system is “a po-
litical nonstarter” because developing countries will
refuse to accept caps and industrialized countries
will refuse to make large resource transfers. But any
control regime with binding targets will have to face
this problem because under international law, coun-
tries must be attracted to participate. A cap-and-
trade system has important advantages. The oppor-
tunity to earn significant resource transfers via
allowance sales can make accepting phased-in caps
(with headroom for future growth) more attractive to
developing countries. And wealthy countries would
undertake these transfers because they yield signifi-
cant cost savings compared with a treaty without
such trading. Moreover, the myriad private transac-
tions involved in formal emissions trading would not
raise the political specter of increasing official foreign
aid financed by taxpayers. The other possibility, a set
of domestic GHG taxes imposed separately by indi-
vidual countries, probably would founder on the
lack of transparency of fiscal systems and the appar-
ent unwillingness of developing countries to sub-
stantially increase their own energy tax burdens.
Fundamental problems for any international
treaty are engaging participation and deterring free
riding (that is, benefiting from the group’s efforts
without participating). Treaty restrictions can be im-
posed only on consenting countries, making any
kind of international collective action difficult. How-
ever, formal emissions trading has signal advantages
over other policy options in securing participation
while limiting the perverse consequences of side
payments. Reluctant countries can be assigned head-
room allowances (an in-kind side payment) that they
can then sell, and the aggregate cap maintains the
environmental effectiveness of the regime. If free rid-
ing is not deterred, the entire collective regime may
unravel. Using allowance trading in a GHG treaty
can reduce free riding: It dramatically lowers the cost
of participation to industrialized countries and raises
the profits from participation for developing coun-
tries. Because noncompliance is just a form of free
riding, these incentives for participation in an emis-
sions trading regime can also enhance compliance.
Emissions leakage—that is, emissions abatement
achieved in one location being offset by increased
emissions in unregulated locations—will afflict any
subglobal treaty, whether it uses trading or not.
Leakage can arise in the short term as emissions
abaters reduce energy demand or timber supply, in-
fluencing world prices for these commodities and in-
creasing the quantity emitted elsewhere. It also can
arise in the long term as industries relocate to avoid
controls. Both informal and formal allowance trading
would reduce such leakage by reducing the abate-
ment cost (thereby reducing the incentive for indus-
try to relocate) and by expanding participation and
inhibiting free riding (thereby enlarging the group of
countries agreeing to constrain emissions). 
An informal market in joint implementation or
CDM credits from abatement projects in uncapped
host countries may raise a special concern about
local (within-country) leakage from these projects
to other emissions sources in the same host coun-
try. However, the question is whether such local
leakage within the project host country would be
greater than the leakage from capped to uncapped
countries that would have occurred if the same
amount of abatement had been undertaken only
within the project investor country. Meanwhile,
local leakage would not be a problem in a formal al-
lowance trading market with national caps, because
all emissions of all participating countries would be
counted in the national inventories used to assess
compliance. 
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Another generic concern regards the ability to
measure the magnitude of abatement efforts. Any
treaty, with or without trading, requires forecasts of
baseline emissions and subsequent monitoring to
evaluate the likely cost of limitation options, the effec-
tiveness of abatement efforts, and the extent of emis-
sions leakage. A formal cap-and-trade system would
not complicate these tasks; it would measure results
using the same national inventories as under an
agreement without trading. The CDM may add some
uncertainty about what the emissions would other-
wise have been in the uncapped project host country.
But prohibiting CDM credits because of such uncer-
tainty would forfeit both the opportunity to engage
countries without national emissions caps in early
GHG control efforts, and the opportunity to obtain
low-cost abatement services in those countries. A bet-
ter approach might be to allow both the cap-and-
trade system and the CDM but to exercise caution by
adjusting the credit for all abatement efforts (not only
the CDM) in proportion to the projects’ measure-
ment credibility, and to invite investors to augment
the credit calculation by showing more reliable emis-
sions accounting—thus providing incentives for in-
vestors to improve measurement capabilities.
Specific Concerns about 
Emissions Trading
Other concerns apply with special force to interna-
tional market-based emissions trading regimes. Yet
these specific concerns often have tended to receive
less attention in the debate over different interna-
tional GHG control strategies. 
Transaction costs include the costs of searching
for trading partners, negotiating deals, securing regu-
latory approval, monitoring and enforcing deals, and
insuring against the risk of failure. High transaction
costs in the emissions abatement market would im-
pede trades and raise total costs. Evidence from pre-
vious U.S. environmental markets such as the lead
phasedown, the Los Angeles smog control program,
and an experiment with water pollution trading on
the Fox River in Wisconsin suggests that transaction
costs can determine the success or failure of the
trading system.
The transaction costs of joint implementation and
the CDM, as currently structured, appear to be very
high. Partners are hard to identify, each negotiation is
novel, each project must be approved by the host
and investor governments (and potentially by the
CDM governance system), and each investor must
monitor its own projects. Moreover, if joint imple-
mentation and the CDM require investors to support
entire projects, each investor bears a large risk of
project failure. The transaction costs of joint imple-
mentation and the CDM could be reduced through
brokers (many of which are emerging), information
exchanges, streamlined approval processes, accred-
ited monitoring agents (including environmental
nongovernmental organizations), mutual funds and
other means of risk diversification, and official credit.
The transaction costs of a formal market for al-
lowance trading would be much lower, especially if
fungible allowances are traded on organized ex-
changes. Indeed, reducing transaction costs would
be a central goal of such a formal system. Lower
transaction costs would improve cost-effectiveness
and also would promise easier opportunities to real-
locate control burdens, thereby helping to facilitate
the initial allocation negotiations. (A GHG tax would
avoid interfirm transaction costs but would entail
significant administrative costs in collecting the tax.)
A second concern is the role of national govern-
ments in the market. National governments might
try to influence the market to their advantage, ob-
struct allowance trades, or otherwise depart from the
conditions of well-functioning abatement markets
assumed in the estimates of cost savings. Govern-
ments might pursue such strategies to favor domes-
tic interests against foreign rivals, to redistribute
wealth within a country, or for other purposes that
in practice conflict with the operation of the interna-
tional climate treaty regime. In the U.S. SO2 trading
system, for example, several states have attempted to
intervene in the national market (for example, by
trying to prevent electric power companies from
switching to lower-sulfur out-of-state fuels, and by
trying to prevent sales of allowances to upwind
sources), but these efforts have so far been blunted
by the limits on states’ power to restrict interstate
trade under the U.S. Constitution. National interpo-
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sitions in a global GHG market could be limited by
international trade law, but this depends on
untested legal questions about whether and how
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
World Trade Organization (WTO) law applies to
trade in GHG allowances. 
Moreover, for trading to be fully cost-effective, na-
tional governments must let the trading be con-
ducted by the entities actually responsible for GHG
abatement and sequestration. Assigning allowances
and credits to these entities will mobilize decentral-
ized competition, creativity, and flexibility. It seems
likely in the United States but might not occur so
well (or at all) in countries where the state is a more
active supervisor or owner of industry. (A GHG tax
would also be vulnerable to national government
manipulation, chiefly via subsidies and changes in
the domestic tax code to buffer the impact of the
GHG tax on domestic industries. Such fiscal cush-
ioning would be exceedingly difficult for outsiders to
monitor and penalize.)
A third specific concern is international market
power. Concentrated power over allowance or credit
prices could arise on the sellers’ side (for example, a
GHG “OPEC”) or on the buyers’ side (for example,
a central sole purchasing agent for industrialized
countries). Although there should be a plethora of
competitors in an international GHG allowance mar-
ket, market power could be enhanced by large state-
run energy or forestry companies and by countries’
efforts to prevent additional countries from entering
the market. Many trading models show Russia as the
main seller of allowances in an Annex I (industrial-
ized country) trading system, and China as another
main seller in a global system. And unlike domestic
antitrust (competition) law, international law has no
basic framework to combat market power; even if it
did, enforcing such rules against nations (or cartels
of nations) could be quite difficult. A successful in-
ternational emissions trading system could require
the evolution of new international antitrust reme-
dies, either in general or specific to the climate
treaty. “Thickening” the market is probably the best
tonic for fears of market power, again underscoring
the importance of broadening participation in the
treaty noted above.
Furthermore, centralized purchasing or sales
agents advocated to reduce search and approval
costs (for example, the CDM governing board, or
proposals to route project investments through a few
multilateral institutions such as the World Bank)
could also invite market power. A better way to re-
duce transaction costs is through organized ex-
changes and fungible allowances.
The International Political Economy 
of Policy Design
Given the advantages of international emissions
trading—lower cost, valuable resource flows, greater
participation—what is one to make of its opposi-
tion? Several speculative hypotheses are worth
exploring. 
Opponents may misunderstand or genuinely
doubt the advantages of international emissions
trading. For example, developing countries’ fears of
“carbon colonialism” may reflect a view that the
market power and trading savvy of wealthy investors
would depress allowance and credit prices, leading
poorer countries to sell out their future at a loss.
This concern may be legitimate, and it warrants
efforts to combat market power and build the capac-
ity of developing countries to bargain effectively in
an allowance trading market.
Opponents may also have nonclimate agendas.
Some may favor a high-cost regime because their ob-
jective is moral condemnation or broader social
change in industrialized countries, not cost-effective
climate protection. Some may worry that fairness re-
quires industrialized countries to take the lead—but
allowance trading does require wealthy countries to
foot the bill for global abatement efforts; and as
noted above, global allowance trading makes devel-
oping countries net winners instead of net losers,
which seems far more fair. 
Strategic behavior may also be at work. First,
some government decisionmakers, in both develop-
ing and industrialized countries, may prefer official
government aid to private market transactions be-
cause they believe they can control the former more
effectively. Indeed some developing country govern-
ment officials may oppose trading because they see
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the market sector, which would gain from allowance
trading, as a domestic political rival—a replay of
similar struggles in the transition from feudal and
state-run societies to market capitalism. Second,
some industrialized countries may prefer a less flexi-
ble control regime because it limits access by their
trade rivals to lower-cost abatement opportunities.
This may explain the European Union’s preference
for an E.U. “bubble” (trading region) under the cli-
mate treaty, but its opposition to unrestricted global
allowance trading and its embrace of cumbersome
“supplementarity” restrictions on trading volumes.
Opposition might also be a move to gain leverage
over the goal (target or cap). Advocates of aggressive
climate protection may withhold support for trading
until it is paired with a more stringent cap—risking a
costly treaty, or no agreement at all. Meanwhile,
skeptics of aggressive climate policy may fear that
cost-effective policy tools are an all-too-enticing “fast
train to the wrong station,” inducing premature
adoption of an overly stringent cap. Of course, the
goal of climate policy should be chosen with great
care. Yet the skeptics’ gambit of urging a higher-cost
“slow train” (in the hopes that it will derail any GHG
limitations agreement) may only invite “Murder on
the Orient Express”—an unholy alliance behind a
treaty that both costs more and is less environmen-




Efficient policy design, such as emissions trading,
has enormous advantages to offer global climate pol-
icy—in climate protection, cost savings, innovation,
and resource flows to developing countries. GHGs
offer an even more attractive case for application of
emissions trading than have many local and regional
pollution problems already well handled with emis-
sions trading. 
But designing efficient global climate policy also
presents several novel challenges. One of these is the
challenge of translating the accumulated national ex-
perience with flexible market-based policy designs
(such as allowance trading) to the international con-
text. The U.S. acid rain trading system cannot just
be transplanted to global climate policy. The legal
and institutional terrain is different at the interna-
tional level, and international environmental markets
need to be designed with that terrain in mind. In
particular, the requirement of consent to interna-
tional treaty law puts extra emphasis on securing
participation, which in turn makes emissions trading
even more attractive at the international level than it
is at the national level, but also requires the use of
headroom allowance allocations to engage otherwise
reluctant emitting countries. To be environmentally
effective and economically efficient, the Kyoto Proto-
col needs to be expanded to engage developing
countries in a global emissions trading regime.
Another challenge is bridging from normatively
desirable policy design to actually adopted policy de-
sign. The economics of climate policy may not match
the politics of climate policy. Even if smart policy de-
signers address the generic and specific concerns sur-
rounding international emissions trading and thereby
deliver an efficient policy design to global climate ne-
gotiators, such a policy design will still confront the
political marketplace in which efficiency may be
viewed with indifference or even antipathy. Empirical
research is warranted to explore and reveal the posi-
tive politics of international climate policy design.
Without such inquiry, designing the most efficient
global climate policy may be for naught.
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